

ability of section 5 loans has made much else possible.

In helping the local community within your territory to increase jobs, and expand the benefits of economic growth, you also are increasing your own business. It is a natural combination, and fulfills the basic aim of REA to bring progress to rural America in many forms.

However, REA leadership in stimulating community development is not always tied to a direct REA power benefit. The manager of a local electric cooperative in Pennsylvania, for example, has led the drive in his community to get four new industries, and each buys power from a private power supplier.

The manager maintains, and correctly so, that both the private and cooperative power suppliers are benefiting, the co-op from new consumers who live in its territory. But most importantly, the community, the people, will benefit from new opportunities.

I am encouraged to see the dedication and energy which local REA co-ops are giving to the RAD program. Reports from about one-third of the REA borrowers indicate that since July 1961 they have helped to launch 400 industrial and commercial projects. It is anticipated that they will directly create 30,000 new jobs, and indirectly, another 22,000. When reports are in from all co-ops, undoubtedly these figures will be higher.

More than one-fourth of these new enterprises involve processing and marketing of farm and wood products, which mean additional outlets for farm and forest products as well as new jobs for rural citizens. This is a real "double shot" in the arm.

It is also important to note that in these newly launched projects, Government financing is playing a "seed capital" role by stimulating the investment of much larger sums by private and local sources. The REA figures indicate that the 400 projects are being financed by more than \$250 million of private capital compared with about \$15 million from Federal Government sources.

These projects are scattered throughout the country. They include a lumber project in Idaho, a furniture factory in Kentucky, a commercial recreation enterprise in Illinois, a packing plant in Nebraska, and a chipping plant in Mississippi. In addition, the 600 REA borrowers report they have assisted their communities in launching a number of public facilities, hospitals, water systems and sewerage systems.

Thus, we have, with your assistance, made a good start with the RAD program, but it is only the beginning, for we have only scratched the surface of the need in rural America.

A good start means that rural electric cooperatives will have more and more to do as rural America responds to the challenge of the sixties, as it moves positively forward once again. And as these things take place, demands for power will expand rapidly.

Presently your members are doubling their power needs every 7 to 10 years. Today, the power requirements of your systems are about 37 billion kilowatt-hours. By 1970, those requirements will soar to 68.6 billion (or more) and by 1985 to almost 200 billion (or more).

President Kennedy has said that power is the key to this century, power on the farms and in rural areas as well as in the cities. At Oahe project in South Dakota last summer he said: "The role of the REA is not finished, as some would believe. To be sure, most farms now have electric lights. Most REA cooperatives and power districts are well established. But we are rapidly approaching the time when this Nation will boast a 300 million population, a \$2 trillion national income, and a grave responsibility as the breadbasket and food producer for a world whose population will have doubled.

That is the prospect for the end of this century, and the key to this century is power, on the farm, in the factory, in the country as well as the city."

The role of the REA is not finished, it is only beginning.

This, I submit, is sound policy and one that will serve the Nation well. Let us, working together, militantly carry it forward.

### It's Only Money

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

#### HON. WILLIAM G. BRAY

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 31, 1963

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Speaker, we have seen a great many comments about the administration's proposals to increase spending by several billions of dollars and to reduce Government income by several billions at the same time. Perhaps few of these comments are as much to the point as the following editorial taken from the January 29 issue of the Washington Daily News:

#### IT'S ONLY MONEY

Sly adulteration and debasement of money probably started with the first coinage. The names of Polycrates of Samos (500 B.C.) and Dionysius of Syracuse (400 B.C.) are associated with the great monetary frauds of antiquity.

Besides setting fire to Rome, Nero reduced the precious metal content of the coinage by 10 percent and pocketed the difference. Henry VIII of England is remembered for his many wives. He also issued a silver-plated shilling, bearing his likeness. When the plating wore off, starting with his most prominent feature, he was known as Old Coppernose.

All this was done in the dark of night. During the Middle Ages the penalty for doctoring the coinage was to have the head held under in a kettle of boiling water. After Hastings, William the Conqueror decreed mutilation, such as having the ears cut off, for anyone caught fooling with the coinage.

As we note, this practice was frowned upon into modern times. It took John Maynard Keynes, in the depression years of the 1930's, to figure out that legal counterfeiting not only was respectable, it actually would help the economy. Lord Keynes probably never intended to go that far but such, in effect, is the deduction of his disciples who are as thick as hors d'oeuvres around Washington.

Since, between Nero and Keynes, paper money had been invented, probably by Kublai Khan or his mandarins, procedures were simplified. It no longer was necessary to melt up the silver and gold, adding copper or other inexpensive metal in the reissue. The printing presses merely could be turned loose to print unlimited quantities of certificates that at least looked like money.

That, in substance, is what we've been doing in the United States for a generation. The sum of this production is tabulated in a major part of the public debt, now \$305 billion in round numbers.

But just as the Romans found the new denarius wouldn't buy as much as the old one, Americans have found the new dollar has lost its punch. At last accounting it had declined in purchasing power to 46 cents as compared to what it would buy just less than 25 years ago.

And the tax cut—spending program thought up by the disciples of Keynes to get

the economy moving again involves more of the same—a great deal more.

In the administration plan it is contemplated that at the end of the 3-year program, \$8.5 billion a year in personal tax-cut money will be pumped into the economy. Every dime of this, and more besides, will be borrowed money—which is just another way of saying it will be printing press money. The deficit for next year alone is very conservatively estimated at just under \$12 billion and even Treasury Secretary Dillon can't look ahead to the year in which the budget may be balanced.

This trick practically is guaranteed to bring a quick flush to the economy. But over the long haul it never has worked in the whole history of money finagling—and never will, except as a means of siphoning away the savings of the people. It is within the power of the Government to call 50 cents a dollar but no government ever has been able to make it buy more than half a dollar's worth.

But they never quit trying.

### Part 5: Let's Keep the Record Straight— A Selected Chronology of Cuba and Castro—September 13–October 14, 1962

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

#### HON. DON L. SHORT

OF NORTH DAKOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 24, 1963

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Speaker, part 5 of my chronology of Cuba and Castro begins with a series of newspaper quotes on our U.S. policy for dealing with Cuba.

While the Monroe Doctrine and its application to the present situation was endlessly debated by our newspapers, our columnists, commentators, and newspapers in other countries—our Congress stubbornly went ahead adopting resolutions upholding the right of the United States to invoke the Monroe Doctrine, protect our country, and protect the entire hemisphere against an extension of the Marxist-Leninist Cuban Government.

Because of the reluctance of our NATO allies to cease shipments of materials and goods to Cuba which would be detrimental to the interests of this hemisphere, the House of Representatives boldly included amendments to our foreign aid appropriations bill which would cutoff aid to any country that permitted its ships to transport goods to Cuba. This perhaps was not what we might call a diplomatic approach but it certainly was a practical approach to the problem. It underlined the psychological approach of appealing to self-interest when the idealistic approach failed.

And on September 21, 1962, Adlai E. Stevenson admitted in the United Nations, in answering Soviet threats, that it was officially known that the U.S.S.R. was stuffing Cuba with planes, rockets, and other arms.

It began to be clear to all who followed the situation that some of our news columnists were about to find themselves

with "egg on their face," because of their weighty—and in some cases—frightened pronouncements on what we as a Nation should do or what we could not do.

A SELECTED CHRONOLOGY ON CUBA AND  
CASTRO—PART 5

September 13, 1962: U.S. policy for dealing with Cuba; "If necessary we can take care of Cuba; and if the necessity is obvious, the Russians, despite what they now say, will acquiesce. They do not have any greater desire to fight a nuclear war over Cuba than we do. Force might some day prove the lesser of two evils for us; but it could never provide a solution for the Cuban problem" (New York Times, Sept. 12, 1962). "The only plausible employment for [the Russians] in Cuba . . . is to do more or less exactly what the Americans are doing in South Vietnam; that is, to train the local army to fight a more advanced kind of war . . . the defense of Cuba against another invasion. Whether [the Russians] are troops or technicians is at bottom immaterial . . . in the sense that the Americans cannot very well assert the right to intervene, whatever the Russians are. Doubtless, in a perfectly ordered world, the Monroe Doctrine would require the removal of these alien intruders. But in the imperfect real world, where the Americans keep troops along the border of the Communist block (in one case, within it; remember Berlin), and claim an unhindered right of access to these outposts, it is going to be awkward, to say the least, to expel or blockade the Russians in Cuba. Mr. Khrushchev has made the neatest of moves in the international chess game; take my pawn in Cuba, he says, and you risk your castle in South Vietnam—or your Berlin queen. If Dr. Castro is one day replaced by a democratic government, it will not be as a result of the one threat against which Russian advisers can give his army any real help—a regular invasion, a la D-day, from over the sea. The United States learned its Cuban lesson in April last year. The United States can perhaps help to organize and supply a rebellion, as the Communists do elsewhere; it cannot import a rebellion, prepackaged. Given enough time, and enough rope, the Cuban regime may yet produce the internal disaffection that will be its downfall. If [Dr. Castro's] support in the countryside begins to fade, one of the conditions of a successful revolt against him will have been established. And if the test ever came, it would be far harder for the Russians to keep an unpopular government in office in Cuba than it is for the Americans to do a similar job in other parts of the world which are better left unnamed. Mr. Khrushchev has no 6th or 7th Fleet to keep his supply lines open. If things go the way the United States hopes—if discontent grows inside Cuba—any further investment in Dr. Castro is going to look very risky indeed to Moscow. Patience, not a choleric lunge, is the Americans' best policy" (Economist, London, Sept. 8, 1962).

"In the hemisphere, in the United Nations, with the uncommitted nations, the reaction [to a U.S. invasion of Cuba] would be most unfavorable for us" (New York Times, Sept. 14, 1962). "The United States is, of course, able easily to blockade Cuba. But stopping ships under threat of seizure or sinking would be an act of war not only against Cuba but against the Soviet Union. The invasion of Cuba would, of course, be an act of war against Cuba. But what we could not be sure of doing is to prevent the retaliatory moves to which we would have laid ourselves wide open, moves against Berlin or against Turkey, or against Iran. For we would have acted on the rule that a possible threat against our security or our interests justifies us in going to war. We would be saying that because Cuba is in

the grip of an unfriendly European power, we have a right to blockade or occupy the island; we would be saying too that the Soviet Union has no such right to act against the American military positions in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, right on her own frontier. Let us not fool ourselves. Such an argument does not wash. It would be rejected, probably even laughed at, not only by all neutrals but by powerful elements among our closest allies. We could go to war if Castro injures us. But we cannot go to war, even against Castro, because of what he may do in the future. We cannot wage a preventive war against Castro without establishing the rule that a preventive war is legitimate against our military position in Berlin, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, South Vietnam, Formosa, Okinawa, South Korea, and Japan" (Walter Lippmann, in the New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 18, 1962). "Cuba has made Mr. Kennedy look like a man with not one, but two, Achilles heels [Berlin and Cuba]. Americans are suffering from the all too familiar affliction of frustration. They think that they were ineffectual in dealing with the Berlin wall and they fear that the administration is going to be ineffectual again in dealing with Cuba . . . acknowledging that an armed invasion of Cuba would mean the deaths of thousands of Cubans, of an untold number of Americans. Not totally precluded are landings by anti-Castro Cubans, avoidance, this time, of a Bay of Pigs disaster and the start of serious guerrilla warfare. Almost everyone is perfectly aware of the dangers of Cuba becoming the scene of another Spanish civil war, in which Russians as well as Cubans would no doubt kill and be killed.

"Perhaps the chief restraining factor on bitter American impatience is that action by the United States against Cuba, including a naval blockade, might tempt Mr. Khrushchev to snap shut the trap in which Berlin finds itself. Yet the administration's own view of the world remains essentially unaltered. It is still thought that Mr. Khrushchev will not in fact risk a third and final world war over Berlin; that, whatever happens there, he still has his own difficulties and that one of them is that his own country is changing, on the whole for the better; and that an eventual easing of tensions through disarmament and bans on nuclear tests is in Russia's interest as well as the West's. Recent events suggest, however, that Mr. Khrushchev, having grasped the fact that general war has become impossible, is tempted as a result to be more rather than less provocative" (Economist, London, Sept. 15, 1962).

On the same day, U.S. Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, Republican, declares that "the American people will not be satisfied with President Kennedy's reiteration of a do-nothing policy toward Cuba."

September 15, 1962: Press reports state that the U.S. Government has had little success in persuading its Allies to withhold ships being chartered to carry Soviet supplies to Cuba. The Governments of Britain, West Germany and Norway are reported to have begun inquiries among their ship-owners, but these are regarded as polite responses to U.S. diplomatic pressure, and center on the question whether Allied ships are carrying arms among their cargo to Cuba. U.S. officials have pointed out to these Governments that the use of Allied ships for ordinary goods releases Communist-bloc shipping for arms deliveries to Cuba.

September 17, 1962: U.S. Secretary of State Rusk briefs members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Forces Committees at a joint closed door session. "Rusk took pains to assert a direct relationship between events in Cuba and Berlin, particularly in the next 3 months. . . . It is widely assumed [in Washington] that the Russians will make the big push in Berlin before the first of

the year, but after the November 6 elections [in the United States].

September 18, 1962: Former U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon urges President Kennedy to take stronger action on Cuba and suggests a program including a naval blockade of the island and the obtaining of commitments from U.S. allies that their vessels will not be used by the Soviet Union for shipments to Cuba. He concedes that the risks of nuclear war are raised by a blockade, but asserts that "the risks of inaction are far greater." He adds that immediate action is needed to "revitalize" the Monroe Doctrine.

The present state of the Monroe Doctrine in relation to Cuba: "The policy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere is guided by two main considerations: its own national security and the peace and security of its hemispheric neighbors. On the one hand, the United States has the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine, enunciated more than a century ago as a warning to European powers that the United States would move against intrusions into the hemisphere. On the other, the United States is pledged, under the Rio Treaty of 1948 which formed the OAS, and under the U.N. Charter, to abstain from unilateral military action. The United States, nevertheless, has affirmed that it would take whatever steps are necessary to move, unilaterally if necessary, against a clear and present threat to its security and that of its allies in Latin America. . . . There is a vocal body of opinion that the Russian shipments of arms to Cuba is a clear threat to U.S. security and therefore a violation of the Monroe Doctrine demanding immediate action. This opinion holds that the Cuban buildup, in effect, constitutes the establishment of a military base by Russia in the Western Hemisphere" (New York Times, Sept. 16, 1962).

"The Monroe Doctrine has been modified to apply only to situations which directly endanger the security of the United States; 'The United States will consider any attempt by European powers to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.' . . . Soviet Russia has made this extension in Cuba, and is amplifying the activity. But President Kennedy has evaluated it thus far as not endangering our peace and safety, thereby narrowing the original scope of the Monroe Doctrine. The fact is clear. But the only administration spokesman who has publicly conceded it is Senator HUMPHREY" (Arthur Krock, in the New York Times, Sept. 18, 1962). "It is true, of course, that the Soviet lodgment in Cuba is a gross violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Yet we cannot invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Why not? The crucial point is that the American claim for the isolation of the Western Hemisphere was coupled with a renunciation of American interest in the Eastern Hemisphere: 'In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do.' . . . This basis of the Monroe Doctrine disappeared in the 20th century. In the two World Wars, the Korean war and the cold war. We cannot invoke the Monroe Doctrine without meeting the question of what we are doing all over Europe and Asia. Our right to put Cuba under surveillance, and if necessary to blockade an invader, rests not on the Monroe Doctrine but on the elementary right of a people to insure its own security. . . . This right can, however, be exercised only when there is a clear and present danger. Castro is an insulting nuisance but he is not, and is not now remotely capable of becoming a clear and present danger to the United States. So we must practice watchful waiting, and hold ourselves in readiness, never for a moment forgetting the vastly greater dangers elsewhere" (Walter Lippmann, in the New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 18, 1962).